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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
·of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM G. ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8938 
HELEN W. ERICKSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
The plaintiff and defendant were divorced on the 
lOth day of February, 1954 (R. 7), the plaintiff being 
granted the divorce, and plaintiff being ordered to pay 
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month. The 
divorce was not contested and was procured subsequent 
to the filing of an appearance, consent and waiver by the 
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defendant acknowledging receipt of a copy of the com-
plaint (R. 3). The conclusions of law (R. 5) and the 
decree (R. 6) ordered child support as set forth in the 
complaint, indicating that the court in its discretion 
adopted the sum agreed to by the parties by means of 
allegations of the complaint and the appearance, con-
sent and waiver, after having heard th~ evidence for the 
divorce. 
On the 23rd day of March, 1956, defendant had 
plaintiff ordered into court to show cause why, among 
other things, he should not be required to pay defendant 
the sum of $350.00 per month as child support (R. 11). 
The defendant appeared as ordered before the Honorable 
.:\Iaurice Harding sitting as a Third District Judge. 
Judge Harding granted attorney's fees, judgment on 
an automobile, and modified the decree allowing the 
defendant to ren1ove the children from the state, but did 
not allow the requested increase in support money or any 
part of the amount. 
On June 2, 1958, defendant brought an order to show 
cause requesting n1odifieation of the decree to increase 
support n1oney from $150.00 to $400.00 per month, alleg-
ing in her petition that the su1n of $400.00 \nls reason-
ably Jw<·e~sar~T to support tl1e children and alleging on 
:infonnation and belief that the plaintiff's incmne had 
substantially inen·a~ed since the divorce and that the 
plaintiff is now earning $~0,000.00 per year (R. 1±). 
This was the only- change of circun1stanees alleged. The 
order ca1ne on for hearing before the Honorable Martin 
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M. Larson on the 11th day of June, 1958. Judge Larson 
allowed the testimony to go back to the time of divorce, 
despite the intervening order to show cause why support 
should not be increased which was heard before Judge 
Harding on March 3, 1956. 
On the 23rd day of June, 1958, the court entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 60-61) and 
order (R. 63) granting the defendant a 50% increase in 
child support and $125.00 attorney's fees. On June 26, 
1958, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. The motion 
was heard by the court and was denied by order filed 
on the 16th day of July, 1958. Plaintiff duly appealed 
from the order modifying the decree and from the denia] 
of the motion for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF F kCTS 
The plaintiff is the father and defendant is the 
mother of Pamela and William G. Erickson, Jr., 11¥2 
and 8 years of age, respectively (R. 25). William G. 
Erickson, Jr. is referred to in the transcript as Eric. 
The parties have been divorced since February 10, 1954. 
The children have been in the custody of the defendant 
during the interim period. The court at the time of the 
divorce ordered support money payments in the sum of 
$150.00 per month, or $75.00 per child. With respect to 
the order to show cause appealed from, the defendant 
testified as follows: 
That she presently resides in Kansas City, Missouri; 
that she has been married since the divorce from the 
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plaintiff, and that her husband died on October 11, 1957 
(R. 25) ; that she is paying $160.00 for an apartment; 
milk and groceries for the two children and herself run 
between $150.00 and $160.00 per month (R. 26), that 
groceries are high because she doesn't have time to shop; 
that lights run $17.00, gas $6.00, and telephone $9.00, and 
that $31.00 of the $32.00 for utilities would be the chil-
dren's share (R. 27). Clothes for the children run $20.00 
per month for each child (R. 27), cleaning for the chil-
dren runs $5.00 per month. Hospitalization insurance 
runs $8.00 per month, lunches for the children run $12.00 
per month, cosmetics for the 11% year old girl, $5.00 per 
month (R. 28), and miscellaneous entertainment runs 
$20.00 per month. Their allowance is $6.00 per month, 
and the total is $314.50 per month for the support of the 
children (R. 26). It will probably cost $500.00 to have 
the children's teeth straightened (R. 29). Plaintiff has 
paid the $150.00 per month decreed by the court with 
the exception of one month in 1957 when he had the chil-
dren (R. 30). Defendant makes $250.00 per month as 
secretary for a hotel manager, 1V"ith the promise of a 
substantial increase when she learns to take shorthand. 
In February, 1954, at the tiine of the divorce, the 
parties were paying $150.00 for a house for plaintiff, 
defendant, and the two children; food for the four per-
sons was $125.00 per month; she didn't lmow the a1nount 
of doctor bills; Pamela has an illness, a heart murn1er, 
that she has had since she was a baby (R. 34). 
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The plaintiff testified as follows: 
That he is an 1\ti.D. surgeon; he has been practicing 
since 1952; and he was a resident in a hospital from 1950 
to 1952 (R. 36); he brought, at the court's order, income 
tax returns from 1953 to 1957, inclusive. The returns 
were prepared by accountants and accurate to the best 
of his knowledge with the exception of 1954 when there 
was a $500.00 tax deficiency which he has subsequently 
been paying to the government. The returns were offered 
and entered in evidence as Exhibit P-4 without objection. 
R. 39 through 40 and R. 45 and R. 46 are a series 
of conclusions and contradictions of the plaintiff regard-
ing interpretation of the income tax returns (Exhibit 4) 
which were prepared by accountants. They are entered 
in evidence and constitute the best evidence of what they 
contain. 
The plaintiff works for American Smelting and Re-
fining, which employment constitutes $6,000.00 per year 
of his income. Kennecott Copper Company has purchased 
American Smelting and Refining and the plaintiff will 
no longer be employed by them after the first of the year, 
or nine months from the date of the hearing. This will 
cause a $6,000.00 decrease in income, together with an 
increase in office expenses (R. 47-48). The plaintiff has 
remarried and ihas three children by this marriage, 
Chuck, 11% years of age, an adopted child, and two 
natural children, Haze, 2% years, and Amy Joe, eighteen 
months (R. 49). The child Haze has a visual defect which 
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will require special care and training and increased ex-
penses. The plaintiff has substantial obligations still 
existing from his marriage to the defendant and their 
divorce, on which he is presently making payments total-
ing $176.00 per month (R. 51). Plaintiff has $788.43 of 
listed current monthly expenses, including $176.00 per 
month on obligations from his marriage to the defend-
ant, $150.00 child support and a $90.00 payment on an 
automobile that is necessary to his profession and earn-
ing ability, thus leaving $144.00 per month for food, 
clothing, medical expenses, and entertainment for a 
family of five persons (R. 51-53). 
Plaintiff has been on no trips other than one trip 
with Pamela and Eric when he went to the Middle West 
to get them in the summer of 1957, and with the excep-
tion of one party for business associates in 1956, has 
done no entertaining (R. 53). His take-home income 
after taxes and deductions is approximately the same 
as in 1954, the year of the divorce (R. 54). 
The $150.00 support money was arrived at by stipu-
lation of the parties and approved by the trial court (R. 
54). 
Plaintiff belonged to a golf club during his marriage 
to the defendant but has had to give up 1nembership 
as he couldn't afford it. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAS BEEN SHOWN SINCE THE TIME OF THE HEARING 
BEFORE JUDGE HARDING IN 1956 OR SINCE THE TIME 
OF THE DIVORCE IN 1954 TO WARRANT AN INCREASE 
IN CHILD SUPPORT. 
II. 
THAT NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT NOR THE 
·CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOW A CHANGE OF CIRCUM-
STANCES TO SUPPORT THE MODIFICATION MADE IN 
THE DECREE. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT MONEY, AND 
ALLOWING THE COURT'S ORDER TO STAND WOULD BE 
GROSSLY INEQUITABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTAN·CES 
HAS BEEN SHOWN SINCE THE TIME OF THE HEARING 
BEFORE JUDGE HARDING IN 1956 OR SINCE THE TIME 
OF THE DIVORCE IN 1954 TO WARRANT AN INCREASE 
IN CHILD SUPPORT. 
The only change of circumstances alleged by the 
defendant in her petition was a substantial increase in 
earnings of the plaintiff since the divorce, the allegation 
being on information and belief that the plaintiff is now 
earning $20,000.00 per year (R. 14). The income tax 
records of the plaintiff (Exhibit 4) are the only compe-
tent evidence as to this allegation, and show the follow-
ing: 
II~:, 
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8 
Year .Adjusted Gross Income Taxable Income 
1954 ----------~-------------$9 ,534.82 
1955 ------------------------10,135.75 
1956 _______________________ 11,596.99 
1957 ________________________ 11,325.06 
The year of the divorce was 1954. 
$6,581.34 
5,284.08 
6,217.72 
4,495.22 
The plaintiff testified that his take-home pay after 
taxes and deductions was approximately the same in 1957 
as in 1954, at the time of the divorce (R. 54). True, the 
plaintiff has acquired additional responsibilities during 
the intervening years, but they were acquired during a 
period when the defendant had also remarried and 
while the plaintiff was abiding fully with the order of 
the court with regard to the support of the children that 
are issue of the 1narriage between the parties. 
\V e contend that the husband in a divorce suit has 
the same right to build a new life and famil~~ as does 
the wife, and his duty to the children of the dissolved 
marriage is equal to but not in excess of his duty to a 
subsequent family. 
The plaintiff faithfully abided by the orders of the 
court with respect to child support ''ith the exception 
of one month when he had the clrildren in his custody, 
and his c I umges of circu1nstances frmn 195± to 1956 were 
such tit at Judge I1arding in the hearing of l\{arch 3, 1956 
(R. 12) did not see fit to grant an increase in child sup-
port requested by that order to show cause (R. 10). The 
income tax returns entered in evidence show a decrease 
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in gross income between the hearing before Judge Hard-
ing and the June 11, 1958 hearing before Judge Larson, 
rather than showing an increase. 
The plaintiff has listed his current monthly expenses 
including $176.00 in obligations still being paid off from 
the first marriage, together with $150.00 child support 
per month and a $90.00 automobile payment on a car 
necessary to his business. None of the other listed ex-
penses can be said to be for luxuries or of a frivolous 
nature, but after payment, the plaintiff's present family 
of five has less for food, clothing, and entertainment 
than the defendant testified she pays for groceries per 
month. 
The defendant's own testimony shows that she is 
presently making $250.00 per month, or $3,000.00 per 
year, where at the time of the divorce she was not work-
Ing. 
Also, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the 
plaintiff will lose $6,000.00 per year by termination of 
his employment with American Smelting and Refining 
Company on or about the first of the year, and before 
his existing obligations are liquidated. This court has 
repeatedly held -
"A divorce decree may not be modified unlestS 
it is alleged, proved, and trial court finds that 
circumstances on which it was based have sub-
stantially changed." Gale v. Gale, 63 U. 261, 253 
P. 2d 986; Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 
P. 2d 419; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 U. 261, 236 
P. 457. 
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"To entitle either party to modification of 
alimony or support provision of a decree of di-
vorce, such party must plead and prove a change 
of circumstances such as to require in fairness 
and equity a change in terms of decree." Osmos 
v. Osmos, 198 P. 2d 233, citing other cases. 
In Hampton v. Hampton, cited supra, at page 420 
this court held : 
"It is well settled in this court that in order 
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the 
moving party must allege and prove changed 
conditions arising since the entry of the decree 
which require, under rules of equity and justice, 
a change in the decree. Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 
Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 
Utah 261, 236 P. 457. It is likewise well settled 
in this state that where the appeal is on a ques-
tion of the propriety of the judgment for alimony 
this court is required to review the evidence in the 
nature of a trial de novo on the record and thl3 
appellant is entitled to the judgment of tlris court 
as well as the trial court on this question. Open-
shaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. (2d) 364: 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214, and 
cases therein cited. 
"The above cases, and cases therein cited, 
likewise establish the rules that it is not necessary 
for this court to find a gross abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court before modifying 
the judgment as to alilnony, and that no general 
rule as to the amount of alimony can be laid down 
to follow in all cases, but the decree in each case 
must be determined upon the facts, the conditions, 
and circumstances of the parties in each particu-
lar case, and that if, upon exan1ination of the 
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record, this court is convinced that the award 
in the trial court is inequitable and unjust, then 
this court should direct such decree as it finds 
to be just and equitable. The amount of alimony 
is measured by the wife's needs and requirements 
considering her station in life and upon the hus-
band's ability to pay." 
In the Hampton case as in the present case, the 
father of the child had married again and had additional 
dependents requiring his support. · 
II. 
THAT NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT NOR THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOW A CHANGE OF CIRCUM-
STANCES TO SUPPORT THE MODIFICATION MADE IN 
THE DECREE. 
The only finding that shows a material change from 
the findings at the time of the original decree is Finding 
No. 2 (R. 60) showing an increase in the age of the chil-
dren. 
The original findings do not show the earning power 
of the plaintiff, but the amount of child support stipu-
lated to by the parties (R. 54) was the amount set forth 
in the amended complaint (R. 1). Defendant acknowl-
edged receipt of a copy of the complaint in her appear-
ance and waiver (R. 3), and the court in its Conclusions 
of Law and Decree adopted that amount after hearing 
the testimony for the divorce. 
The court must also take into account the absence 
of findings and conclusions in the order signed by Judge 
Harding on the 6th day of April, 1956 (R. 12). In the 
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order to show cause from which that order arose, the 
defendant requested an increase in child support from 
$150.00 to $350.00 per month which, upon plaintiff's ap-
pearing and showing cause, was not granted. The plain-
tiff's income has decreased rather than increased since 
the time of that hearing. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT MONEY, AND 
ALLOWING THE COURT'S ORDER TO STAND WOULD BE 
GROSSLY INEQUITABLE. 
In considering all the evidence it would appear that 
the defendant is now spending for an apartment for 
herself and the two children $192.00 per month, con-
sisting of $160.00 per month rent and $32.00 utilities (R. 
26-27), as compared to the $150.00 rental for the family 
of four at the time of the divorce (R. 32), and plaintiff's 
$126.00 house payments plus utilities for his present 
family of five. The defendant testified she spends 
$150.00 to $160.00 per month for food and milk, plus 
$20.00 per month per child for clothes, while the plaintiff 
has $144.00 per month for food, clothing and entertain-
ment for a family of five, and the parties and their 
children before the divorce subsisted on $125.00 per 
month. 
It would appear that the defendant has acquired 
extremely expensive tastes, which might well account 
for a good portion of the existing indebtedness being 
paid off by the plaintiff. The increase granted b~T the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
trial court is in the sum of $75.00 per month, or $900.00 
per year, and amounts to well over 50% of the increase 
in plaintiff's adjusted gross income between 1954 and 
1957, and over 100% of the taxable increase of the plain-
tiff during those years. The income tax forms entered 
in evidence by the plaintiff show there was an actual 
decrease in taxible income for the year 1957 in compari-
son with any of the prior years. While it is true that 
the plaintiff has additional exemptions that he did not 
have in 1954, these exemptions were acquired during a 
period when the plaintiff was complying fully with the 
court's child support decree, and while the plaintiff's 
adjusted gross income is substantially as found by the 
court in Finding No. 5, it is only slightly increased from 
the time of the divorce, and his change of circumstances 
with regard to responsibilities and liabilities shows a 
more serious financial condition in 1958 than the evi-
dence shows in 1954. We refer again to the Hampton 
case wherein the court holds in 47 P. 2d, page 421: 
"It may be conceded that $50 per month is 
necessary for the support of the plaintiff and 
their minor child, but the more difficult question 
is whether the defendant is able to pay this 
amount of alimony under his present circunl-
stances. We are convinced that the changed con-
ditions appearing in the record require a reduc-
tion in the amount of alimony as fixed by the trial 
court, which we feel is more than the defendant 
is able to pay, and at the same time maintain hi3 
station in life as a teacher and support his present 
family; and, accordingly, we have determined that 
the amount should be reduced to $45 per month." 
I;~ 
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In the present case, the pleadings show that the 
defendant entered her appearance and waiver with full 
knowledge of the amount of child support agreed upon 
by the parties and of her situation at that time. The 
court concluded in its Conclusions of Law that the plain-
tiff should pay to defendant for the support of the chil-
dren $150.00, and made that order in the decree. VvT e 
do not contend that the decree of the court may not be 
modified, but contend that there is no showing, let alone 
pleading, of a substantial and permanent change in cir-
cumstances justifying any increase whatsoever, but the 
trial court ordered a 50% increase in child support. The 
change shown by the evidence indicates a much greater 
financial responsibility on the shoulders of the plaintiff 
with little increase in earnings from 1954 through 1956, 
and an actual decrease between 1956 and 1957. On the 
other hand, the testimony of the defendant indicates 
that she has an income of $3,000.00 per year, where she 
had no income at the time of the divorce. Her testimony 
also shows that her main financial change as far as the 
children go is an existence on a higher standard of living 
when judged by monetary expenditures than that which 
plaintiff is now living and considerably higher than the 
Erickson family was living at the time of the divorce. 
In fact, it shows a standard of living far beyond the 
means of the $250.00 per n1onth secretary to a hotel 
manager. The expenses for which the plaintiff is liable 
are fully set out in the incOine tax returns, and his testi-
mony indicates a financial situation despite earnin~ 
capacity which makes the payment of $150.00 per month 
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as child support difficult, and the payment of $225.00 
as ordered by the court impossible. 
SUM11ARY 
Plaintiff contends that the pleadings do not allege, 
that evidence considered as a whole does not show, and 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are insuffi-
cient to support the decree by Judge Larson substan-
tially increasing payments of child support. We readily 
agree that on the scale which the defendant is attempting 
to live the $75.00 per month per child is an inadequate 
amount. However, on the other hand, the status of the 
doctor's financial affairs and present responsibilities 
make it inequitable if not impossible for him to pay an 
increased amount of child support at this time, especially 
in view of the pending loss of $6,000.00 salary per year, 
together with a considerable part of office and personnel 
expenses now furnished by the American Smelting and 
Refining Company. True, the doctor over a period of 
years can possibly build his income back to its present 
level and the 1954 level through private practice, but he 
is placed in an even worse financial condition by being 
forced to comply with the order appealed from. He will 
be under an extreme handicap in maintaining his pro-
fessional reputation and standing in building his income 
to a point where an increase over and above the $150.00 
ordered at the time of the divorce is justified and proper. 
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It seems to be the general public opinion that the 
fact that a person is an M.D. puts them in a financial 
class by themselves. The entire record, including the 
testimony of the income tax return exhibits, shows that 
the plaintiff in this matter is in bad financial straits 
despite an annual income above average, before business 
expenses and pre-existing personal expenses not entirely 
attributable to the plaintiff are considered, which makes 
the money available for actually existing insufficient to 
make the decree of the trial court equitable. 
We sincerely request that the court in its capacity 
to review the facts as well as the law in equitable matters 
of this type, reverse the decision of the lower court, and 
order the original child support payments of $150.00 per 
month or $75.00 per child reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SU~fNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
